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ｾＬｃｏｉｬｏｬｬｬｬ ｾＺＺ Gn)'..,th Cind the E'oc ial Ｈ ［ ｶ ｭ ｴ Ｚ Ｇ ｾ ｲ ｳ ｨ ｩ ｰ
of lIver-head Capital, I
II. Uzawa
1. In the last few years, the economist has becollle keenly
aware of the limitations ｾ ｨ ｩ ｣ ｨ the environment poses upon
the J:.:rocess of ecollvrnic growth. This is primarily due to
the fact that the process of rapid and steady economic
ｾ ｲ ｯ ｷ ｴ ｨ \.hic!l l!hlny industrialized countries hdve exp(>rieflced
jisturllng social and economic problems such as the
pollutilAl cf air und \-Jater, anu the destruct10n of tne
urtun t:::nvil.onment. These phehomena are related to tlw
misrllanaQ8mC'l,t of the envircmnlent, l.n its broadest terniS
includli:q s,)clal as ｷ ｾ ｬ ｬ ilS natural envirunwents, and have
result.e,l iu the further inequity ill the distr.ibution of
real living ｳ ｴ ｡ ｮ ｾ ｡ ｲ ､ Ｎ
IIm"ever, the tradi tiOIW.l econom.ic thevI'l seems to have
failed to provide a coherent framework within which the
interactions between the environment and ordinary economic
activities may Le analyzed anrl effective policy measures
formulated in orcier to remedy such social disturbances. One
of the major reasons for th1S failure, I believe, is due to
the fact that the traditional economic theory, of which the
neoclassical economic theory in the broadest sense constitutes
the basic theoretical framework, is primarily concerned with
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d L·k·L·Cntl.. ｡ｬＱｚｌｾ､ ｉＱｾＬｪＮｲｫ･ｴ economy ｷ ｨ ･ ｮ ｾ all resourct's
lind tUl:.ional to economic processes are ｰ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｡ ｴ ･ ｬ ｹ appropriated,
while the environment is by its nature not appropriated to
individual members of the society but owned and managed
collectively by the society as a whole.
In order to analyze the role which the environnhmt
ｾ ｬ ｡ ｹ ｳ in the process of economic growth, therciore, one
Heeds to re-examihe the basic theoretlcal framework of the
neoclassical economic theory in such a way that those
scarce resources which are collectively owned and managed
by the society are explicitly treated and analyzed in terms
of a coherent theoreticul frammmrk. In this paper, I should
like to present a preliminary report on the econOffiLCS of
social overhead capital and to indici.lb:> a nwnL..=::r of
Vropositlons concerning the allocation of resources for the
construction and maintenance of overhead capital and the
optimum rules concerning the use of the services derived from
such overhead capital.
'1'he paper will ｢ ｦ ｾ divided into blO parts. 'l'he first
part concerns itself with the problems of the amount of
resources to be devoted for the construction of overhead
capital and for the rules to be imposed upon the use of the
services derived from such overhead capital. In the second
part, I shall be concerned with the criteria by which the
society decides to designate some of the scarce resources
as social overhead capital not to be privately appropriable,
and the rest to be appropriated to individual members of the
society.
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2. Social overhead capital comprises all those scarce
resources which are put in use for the members of the
ｳ ｯ ｾ ｩ ･ ｴ ｹ Ｌ either free of charge or with a negligible price.
They are either produced collectively by the society or
simply endowed within the society.
Thus all the means of production may be classified
into t\vO categories: private means of production dnd social
overheud capital. The classification, however, is not
｡ Ｐ ｳ ｯ Ｑ ｵ ｾ ･ Ｌ but it depends upon the historical, political,
anJ social aspects of the society in question. The same
type of capital goods may be privately appropriated in one
society, but not in another, while it is entirely possible
that in the same society a capital good may be classified
as private at one time and as social at another time,
delJenl1ing upon the stage of ecullOIaic and social }?rogrcss.
Firs t, I shall not be concerned \vi th the criteria by which
means of production are classified into two categories,
but instead I shall postulate that such a classification
has already been made and will not change throughout the
cour;.,e of the discussion.
Private means of production are appropriated tv
individual members of the society who are responsible in
the management of those private means of production
which they own. Individual members are concerned with
attaining the maximum amount of profits or pleasure in
accordance with the rules prevailing in the society.
-4-
On the other hand, social overhead capital in principle
is put to use for any member of the society either free of
charge or with a negligible cost. For the sake of
simplicity, it is assumed that social overhead capital is
provided free of charge to every member of the society.
The services provided by social overhead capital belong
to the category of public goods or services for which the
fonnal analysis was presented by Samuelson in his classical
articles. The Samuelsonian analysis, however, is concerned
with pure public goods, which excludes most of the familiar
examples of services provided by social overhead capital.
I am particularly concerned with two aspects of social
overhead capital which are not handled by the Samuelsonian
approach. The ｦ ｾ ｲ ｳ ｴ is generally concerned with the range
of freedom in which each member of the society may use the
services of social overhead capital. Most of social over-
head capital requires the input of certain amounts of
private means of production, and each member of the society
uses the services of such social overhead capital to the
extent which he thinks most desirable.
I should like to pay particular attention to the second
aspect which is related to the phenomenon of conjestion.
As typically illustrated by the eXillnple of roads, the
benefit each individual gets from the use of a certain
amount of social overhead capital depends upon the extent
to which other members of the society are using the same
-5-
socidl overhead capital. Again, the Samuelsonian concept of
pure public goods necessarily excludes the possibility of
such social overhead capital for which the phenomenon of
conjestion arises.
In "Sur la theorie du capital social collectif, cahier
d'econometrie et economie mathematique" Ｈ Ｑ ｾ Ｗ Ｔ Ｉ Ｌ I have
developed a formulation of social overhead capital where
the two aspects as discussed above may be to a certain
extent taken care of there.
It is assumed that private means of production and
social uverhead capital are respectively composed of homo-
Ｇ Ｑ ･ ｮ ｾ ｯ ｵ ｳ and measurable quantities. Social overhead capital
may be used ･ ｩ ｴ ｨ ｾ ｲ in the processes of production or
dirt:!ctly in the l.Jrocesses of consumption. However ,it is
assumed that the economy is composed of a large number of
economic units, each of which does not exercise any
significant influence on the aggregate level of economic
activities. Finally, it is assumed that each con'sumption
unit possesses a measurable utility which depends upon the
amount of the services·of social overhead capital as well as
upon the amount of private goods being consumed.
3. To ｾｸｰｬ｡ｩｮ the essential nature of the present approach,
I shoulu. like first to concentrate upon the case where
social overhead capital is used as a factor of production
only. Social overhead capital is assumed to be composed
of a honlogeneous and measurable quantity. hence, it is
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possible to measure the amount of social overhead capital
existing within the society at every moment of time. Let
V be the stock of social overhead capital thus measured.
Production processes of each production unit in the
society are affected by the amount of the services derived
from social overhead capital as well as those provided by
private means of production. Namely, the output Qa
produced by a production unit a depends upon the amount
of private means of production Ka and the services XB
derived from social overhead capital. Thus, the production
function may be denoted by
However, as is typically illustrated by the example of
highWili'3, the effectiveness of the services of social over-
head capital is influenced by the amount of public ｳ ｾ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｣ ･ ｳ
Lein9 u::;ed by other production units as well as b}p the
amount ｾ of social overhead capital existing in the
society. lIenee, the production function may be rewritten
as
wherE' X st-.inJs for the aqgregate amount of the ｳ ｦ Ｍ Ａ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｣ Ｈ Ｚ ｾ ［ of
social overhead capital used by all other product.ion unitu
existiny in the society.
ＭＷｾ
If it is assumed that there is a continuulIl of
production units existing in the society, the aggregate level
X of the services of social overhead capital used by all
production units may be denoted
whE::re the integral is always taken from 0 to 1.
It is assumed that social overhead capital becomes
congestej as more usage is made of it by other production
units. ｔ ｨ ｾ phenomenon of congestion may be explicitly
stated Ly the fullowing properties. l"irst, the amount of
output is uecreased as the aggregate level X of ｳ ｯ ｣ ｾ ｡ ｬ
overhead capital being used is increased. ｎ ｾ ｮ ･ ｬ ｹ Ｌ
'J
F'J < 0 (")
X
Secondly, the marginal product of either private means of
production or s0cial overhead capital is decreased 3S X is
increased.
On the other hand, an increase in the endowment V of
social overhead capital results in a shift upward cf the
prcuuct.1.on function. Hence, it may be asslimed that
In addition, it will be assumed that the production
］ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｾ Ｐ ｮ satisfies the standard neoclassical conditions,
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i.e. the marginal rates of substitution are always
diminishing and the law of constant rates of returns
prevails when all the variables are taken into account.
Suppose that production units all produce identical
goods and that markets for output and private means of
production are both perfectly crnnpetitive. Bach production
unit then chooses the combination of private means of
production and pUblic services that ｾ ｬ ｩ ｬ ｬ maximize the net
profit. Let r be the price, quoted in terms of output, of
the services rendered by private means of production,
prevailing in the factor market. The net profit of the
production unit e is given by
( )
and the production unit 13 chooses the combination of KS
and Xs that maxinlizes the profit for given levels of the
endowment of social overhead capital V and the aggregate
level X of the services of social overhead capital being
used currently. Since social overhead capital is offered
free of charge, the maximum profit is obtained when the
following marginal conditions are satisfied:
= r , ( )
Demand for private capital KB and social capital XB
by the production unit B is now uniquely determined by the
-9-
by the rentals rate r. An increase in r results in a decrease
in the demand for private capital KS. If the production
processes are complementary, the demand for social overhead
capital Xa is shown to be decreased when the rentals rate r
for private capital goes up.
The aggregate demand schedule for private capital then
is given by summing up individual demand schedules:
( )
ｾｨｵｳＬ in order for a market equilibrium to be obtained,
the following two conditions have to be satisfied: first,
the rentals rate r for private means of production is so
deternlined as to equate the aggregate demand with the
supply of private means of production; and second, the
aggregate demand for the services of social overhead capital
is equal to the level with respect to which the individual
delnand both for private means of production and social
overhead capital is derived.
If the supply of private means of production is
inelastically given at K, then the equilibrium conditions
may be explicitly stated as follows:
F B = r, F B = 0KB Xs
,
K = JKS d S ,
( )
( )
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x = J Xl) d a
and
Up
(3
= F (Ks'Xa,X,V)
( )
( )
The aggregate real output (real net ndtional product)
Q tht,m is yiven Ly
( l
The aggregate level of the services of social overhead
capital being used Xp is related to the rentals r.ate r. In
order tv derive the aggregate demand schedule for private
capital, it is necessary to take into account the adjustIflent
in the aggregate use of social overhead capital. Mathemat-
ically, the system of equilibrium conditions (3) - (5)
has to be solved with respect to K, XB' and X, for given
levels of the rentals rate r and the endowment of social
overhead capital V. It is easily shown that an increase
in the rentals rate r is accompanied by a aecredse in Ka•
XS' and X. Hence, the demand schedule for the aqgregate
level of private capital has a downward slope as a function
of the rentals rate r.
The equilibrium rentals rate r, therefore, is uniquely
determined by the equilibrium condition (4) for the given
endowment of private capital K. The aggregate real output
Q may be accordingly determined for the given aMounts of
private capital K and social overhead capital V.
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It may be easily shown that the equilibrium rentals
rate r is decreased as either the ･ ｮ ､ ｯ ｾ ｮ ｾ ｮ ｴ of privatp
capital K or that of social overhead capital being used tends
to increase, because of the assumption that private capital
ana social capital are complementary.
One can easily infer from the existence of external
･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｮ ｩ ･ ｳ with respect to social overhead capital that
market: allocation is not optimum. r.£'he prub1em then arises
if it is possible to devise a rule by which the optimum
allocation of vrivate and social means of production may
be obtained. To examine this problem, Ｑ ･ ｾ me next consider
the allocation scheme where social overhead capital may be
ｾ ｾ Ｇ Ｚ Ｚ Ｇ ｣ ｃ ､ for it:.. 'J.saqe.
ｌ ｾ ｴ me cUllsider now the situation ｷ ｨ ｾ ｲ ･ IJrivate
individuals are charged a price for the use of social
overhead capital according to the amount of services being
used, where it is assumed that the administrative costs
｡ ｾ ｳ ｯ ｣ ｩ Ｇ Ｚ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ Ｇ Ｑ with the pricing scheme are ni.:::gliglLle. PLi.vatl:"'
means of production are allocated in .:.l perfectly competitive
nlarket.
Let 0 Le the price charged per unit of ｳ ･ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｣ ｾ ｳ derived
from ｳ ｯ ｣ ｾ ｡ Ｑ overhead capital. The net profit uf the
production unit 8 now becomes
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The net profit thus defined is maximized if the following
marg1ndlity conditions are satisfied:
= r
Other equilibriwn conditions are identical with those
obtained for the previous situation; namely,
K = J K(:S ､ｾ
X = JXs ､ｾ , and
Q'3 = F(S(KS'XB,X,V)
It is assumed that private cRpital is inelastically
supplied at the level K and the ･ ｮ ､ ｯ ｾ ｮ ･ ｮ ｴ of social over-
head capital is given at V. For a g1ven price 0 for the
use of social overhead capital, the system of equilibrium
condit1ons are solved to determine the equilibrium
allocations of private capital and social overhead capital,
KS and XS' together with the aggregate level of the ｳ ･ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｣ ･ ｾ
of soc1al overhead capital X being used. It is easily show.1
that ｴ ｬ ｾ equilibriwn rentals rate r for private capital is
also uniquely determined for a given price 0.
Let Kp (0), Xa(O), and X(0) be respectively the
eyuilibrium allocations of private capital and social
capital, and the aggregate level of social capital being
-13-
used, all corref;;ponding to the imputed ｰ ｲ ｾ ｣ ･ Ｈ Ｉ ｾ 'l'he
resulting ｡ ｧ ｧ ｲ ･ ｾ ｡ ｴ ･ real output Q(O) may be denoted by
,
\ll.ere Q b (li) stand.s for the equilibrium output of production
unit () ｾ
It muy Le ｩ ｬ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ Ｚ ［ ［ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｧ tv see if the ｴ Ｎ ｬ ｱ ｱ ｮ ｾ ｴ ｊ ｡ ｴ ･ real
output Q(0) is increased or not when the imputed price 0
is increased. Uifferentiating (12) with respect ｴ ｾ the
imput€.:u yrice 0, one obtains the following relatiollships:
(lU (0) J !FP
dK
a
(0)
:.< ､ｘＨｾ (0) 10,11 ｧｾＱ0.0- ----+ r· -<.ic)- + drsK8 de Xs x
ｬＱｾＮＮｮ｣･Ｌ relationships may be reduced to the following:
,
which ｾ Ｓ ｙ be rewritten as
dQ(O) = (MSC _ E) ( _ ､ｾＩde- dO
where
H.SC = - J
'l'he ｾ ｸ ｰ ｲ ･ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ (13) corresponds to the concept of the
marginal sucial costs associated with the use of social
overhead capital. It represents the loss in the aggreyate
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real output due to the marginal increase in the use of
social overhead capital.
Since an increase in the imputed price 0 reduces the
aggregate usage X of social overhead capital,
dX < 0
dO
Hence, whether an increase in the imputed price increases
the aggregate real output Q(O) or not depends upon the
difference between the marginal social costs, MSC, and the
imputed price O. Namely, if the imputed price 0 is less
than the marginal social costs MSC, then the aggregate real out-
put. is Q (0). 'l'he maximum aggregate real output Q (0) then
may. be obtained when the imputed price 0 is just equal to
the marginal social costs MSC.
Starting with the market solution which corresponds to
the case where 0 = 0, the aggregate real output Q(0) is
increased until the imputed price 0 is equated to the
marginal social costs MSC. Hence, it is possible to devise
an iterative procedure by which the maximum aggregate real
output may be obtained, provided the marginal social costs
may be calculated from the known allocation of private and
social capital anlong individual units.
Tne procedure discussed above relies upon the price
mechanism for the allocation of both private and social
capital. Suppose now that it is possible, without incurring
any costs, to make a centrally controlled plan as for the
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allocation of scarce means of production. It is supposed
for the moment that a central planning board possesses a
complete knowledge about the production processes of each
production unit. What would then be the allocation of
private and social capital among individual production
units that maximizes the aggregate real output? This
pruiJlem may be ｬ ｵ ｾ ｴ ｨ ･ ｭ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ stated as follows:
ｌ ｾ ｴ K anll V be the given endowments of private capital
anJ social overhead capital. Then find the allocation of
privute capital among production units K and the levels of
individual and aggregate uses of social overhead ｣ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｬ Ｌ
Xs i1nd X, so as to maximize the aggregate real output
u == f ('13 dB
subject to the constraints:
K = J K dBB ,
and
,
Such a ｭ｡ｸｩｾｩｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ problem may be easily solved in
terms vf Lagrange mUltipliers. Let rand 0 be respectively
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constrdints
(19) and (20), and introduce the Lagrangian form:
-16-
The optimum allocation may now be obtained by finding the
allocation for which the Lagrangian may be maximized without
any constraints.
'l'herefore, the optimum allocation may be obtained by
solving the following equations:
= 0
\) = -
to':)ctber with the cunstraintu (19-21).
'l'hesc cunditions are iuentical with those which have
been ｯ ｬ ｊ ｴ ｡ ｾ ｮ ･ ｊ for the case where the imputed ｰ ｲ ｩ ｣ Ｈ ｾ fer
social overhead capital 0 is equated to the marginal social
costs HSC.
lienee, the allocative process discussed in the ｰ ｲ ｾ ｶ ｩ ｯ ｵ ｳ
sectic.Jf1 resul ts ｾ ｮ an optimwn allocation of scarce resources.
In the andlysis presented in the prevL0us ｾ ｣ ｣ ｴ ｾ ｵ ｮ ｳ Ｌ it
has Leen assumed that the economy is composed of proJucers
only, withQut having consumers to play any role in the pro-
cess of resource allocation. I should like to consider the
general case where consumerS are involved with the
allocative process of both private capital and social over-
head capital.
-17-
LE::t tl1u consumers be denoted by the generic symbol el,
rangin9 continuoL1s numbers from 0 t.o 1, as has Leen the
case with producers. Namely, it is assumed that the
economy is composed of a large number of consumers each of
whom plays a role which is negligible from the aggregative
point of view. The process of aggregation again will be
deuuted by the integral.
The level of utility each consumer may enjoy is related
to the amount of the services derived from social overhead
capital as well as private consumption. Again as has been
with the case for producers, it may be assumed that there
is only one kina of private consumption goods and tlwt the
services from social overhead capital are measurable. By
ad\)ptili':J the btnthamite utility conc.:ejJt, it !f1ay be assumed
that conswner u's utility U is a function of the level of
u
private consumption C and the amount X of the services
u a
derived from social overhead capital. In view of the
presence of the congestion phenomenon, the effectiveness of
the services of social overhead capital to consumer u
depends upon the aggregate level X of the ｳ ･ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｣ ｾ ｳ of social
capital being used as well as upon the stock of social
overhead capital V. Namely, it may be written as
U
a
where the aggregative level X has to be defined by
-18-
It is assumed that the utility function U is
concave with respect to the variables Ca , Xu' X, and V, and
that the marginal utility of private consumption is positive,
while that of the services of social overhead capital is
merely decreasing.
If the services of social overhead capital are rendered
to consumers free of charge, then each consumer will use
them up to the level where the marginal rate of sUbstitution
between social overhead capital and private consumption
equals zero and all of his income Y will be spent on
a
private consumption C •
a
Murket equilibrium will be attained when these
conditions concerning consumers' equilibrium are satisfied
together with producers' equilibrium conditions discussed
in the previous section. It is obviously seen that the
resulting pattern of resource allocation is neither
efficient nor optimum.
In the general situation where consumers are present,
one may have to be careful in defining the concept of
optimum resource allocation. However, if the Benthamite
concept of measurable and comparable utility is pre-
supposed, Lnen the social utility U is simply defined by
the aggregate of individual levels U ; namely,
a
U = J Ua da ,
where the integral ranges over all the consumers in the
society.
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A ｾ｡ｴｴ･ｲｮ of resource allocation and the accompanying
income distr1bution may be defined as optimum if the social
utility U is maximized among the feasible set of resource
allocation. This statement may be put in a more precise
form as follows:
At eac.:h moment of time, let the amounts of private and
social ｣ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｬ be given at K and V, respectively. A pattern
of rCS0UrCE! allocation (C X K XI') is liefined 0l)timum
a.' u' /5' f.'
if the social utility U is maximized among the set of all
ｦ ｾ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｵ ｬ ｾ resource allocations:
Let P, PO' pr, be respectively the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the constraints (2U), (30), and (31). Then
a simple calculation will show that an optimum allocdtion
has to satisfy the following conditions:
, or
a.' utIUe IUe = 1 for all pairs ,J' and (I"(1' a."
-20-
PF = rKS
,
ｾｨ･ marginal social costs associated with the ｵ ｾ ･ of
social overhead capital in the present context becom8s:
MSC = J - ｵｾＯｵｾ da + J ｾ ｆｾ ､ｾ
ex
The optimum conditions (32-35) suggest that, in order
to obtain an optimum resource allocation, it is necessary
to introduce a transfer mechanism in such a manner that the
marginal rate of distribution between any pair of two
consumers becomes unity
MRD , " (=.:a a ｵｾｾＬ ) = 1tla ,r-
call
in addition to the pricing scheme for the use of social
overhead capital according to the marginal social cost
principle.
The analysis so far has been concerned with the allocation
of scarce resources where the stock of private and social
capital has been assumed to be given. The analysis may be
extended to the situation where one is concerned with the
process of capital accumulation for both private and social
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capital, and try to examine the pattern of resource
allocation over time which is optimum from a dynamic
point of view. It will be shown that the principle of the
marginal social costs mCiY be extended to this dynamic ca::>e
and the criteria for optimum allocation of investment
｢ ･ ｴ ｷ ･ ｾ ｮ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｶ ｡ ｴ ･ and social capital will be obtained within
the framework of the Harnsey theory of optimum growth.
In order to simplify the exposition, it will be
assumeu, throughuut the rest of this paper, that the rate
of discount by which consumers discount their future levels
of utility is constant and identical for all consumers in
the society. Let 6 be the rate of discount. The level of
social utility U may now be expressed by
U = JW U(t)e- ot dt
0 0
ｾｨ･ｲ･ the utility level I U(t) at a point of time t may be
given y
,
with
= ua (C (t) , X (t) , X(t) , V(t) )
a u
Let V
o
be the stock of social overhead capital
p.xisting at the initial point of time O. I am concerned
with the problem of finding a path of private consumnt.ion
-22-
for each consumer, of allocation of private and social
capital between various economic units, and of capital
accumulation for both private and social capital over time
such that the resulting level of social utility is maximized
over all feasible paths. In order to discuss this optimum
problem, I should like to pay a particular attention to the
difference between private and social capital with regard to
the extent to which investment is used to increase the stock
of capital (to be measured in the efficiency unit). In
general, social overhead capital is difficult to reproduce
in the sense that a rather significant amount of scarce
resources have to be used in order to increase the stock
of capital, while, for private capital, investment
without much difficulty, converted into the
accwlluL:Jtion of capital. It may be possible to formulate
the relationships between the amount of investment and the
resulting increase in the stock of capital ｾ ｮ terms of a
certain functional relationship.
Let Iv be the amount of real investment devoted to the
accumulation of social overhead capital. If social overhead
capital V is measured in a certain efficiency unit, the
amount of real investment IV may not necessarily result in
the increase in the stock of capital by the same amount.
Instead, there exists a certain relationship between the
amount of real investment IV and on the one hand the
corresponding increase V in the stock of social overhead
capital and the current stock of social overhead capital V
on the other:
-23-
This relationship may be interpreted as follows:
i.e. ｾ ｬ ｬ order to increase the·stock of social overhead
ｾ
CLll:Ji.tal V by the amount: V, real investment· IV has to be
S[-'011t 01t ｴ Ｎ ｬ Ｑ Ｈ ｾ ｡ ｃ ｬ ｾ ｕ ｬ ｬ ｬ ｕ ｬ ｡ ｴ Ｎ ｩ ｶ ･ activities for ｾ ［ ｯ ｣ ｩ Ｎ ＼ ｴ ｬ overhead
｣ Ｌ Ｍ ｾ ｶ ｾ ﾷ ｴ ｡ ｬ Ｎ In \-/hizt tollows it '....ill Le assurcbl thGlL t.he
function ｾ ｽ exhibits l..l reCJture' of constant rctllrn:3 to scale
. '
with respect to V and V, thus
Sl.nce it may be assumed that the marginal costs of
investlnent arf3 increasing as the level of invcGtmcnt is
ｩ ｮ ｃ ｲ ｾ ｑ Ｓ ･ ､ Ｌ the function .y satisfies the following cunditions:
,
II
lfIy <.) > 0
Similar relationships may be postulated for the
accumulation of private capital for ｾ ｡ ｣ ｨ producing unit;
namely, for each producer ｾ Ｌ the amvunt of real investment
Ie r0yuircd to increase the stock of ｾ ｡ ｰ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｬ Ka by the
.
amvllr.t K 6 may La determined by the following ｆ Ｈ ｾ ｮ ｲ ｯ ｳ ･
filnctiult:
where the Penrose function ｾ ｂ again satisfies the conditions:
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ｬ ｾ ｬ ｬ ｲ ｴ ｨ ･ ｲ ｉ Ａ ｬ ｯ ｮ ｾ Ｌ it is asswned that the ratE! of
d8preciation of social overhead capital depends upon the
ｅ Ｚ ｽ ｾ ｴ ･ ｮ ｴ to ""hich it is used. ｈ ｬ ｾ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｌ the rate of deprQciation
,
l..l \!lay be written as
lJ ::.: lJ(X!V)
,
lJ (.) > 0 , "lJ (.) > 0
'l'!le optimum problem !Ilay nO\'1 be !llOre prt":!cisely stated
'If; foll.o\'IS:
A path of resource allocation over ｴ ｾ ｮ ｾ Ｌ (C (t), I,(t;,
Lt ｾ \
IV (t), )C (t), x,) (t), R., (t), V (t) ), iB def.iHetl as ｦ ｅ Ｚ ｾ ｩ Ｚ ｬ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･
u J ｾ
if it· Hutisfies the following consistency conditions:
Q (t) = J C (t) d + J ItJ(t} dB + IV(t)a a
() (t) = J F B Ｈｬｾ B(t) , X (3 (,t) , ｾｾ (t) , V (t.) ) dC
X (t) o- J x· (t) du + J XB (t) <1130.
•Ifj (t) K u (t)
= 4>!3(ze(t» 1-' = Z (I (t)K B (tT ｫ Ｌ ｾ (IT ｾｾ
,
V(t)_ IX(t)1
V.(t) - zv(t)-jJ Vet) ,
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V(O) = VO given.
I am then interested in finding a feasible path of
resource allocation over time which maximizes the social
utility.
'L'his optiJlIWn proLlem is in general extremely difficul t
to solve, and I shall be instead concerned with findiu9 a
path of resuurce allocation which approximates the optimum
path to a reasonable extent. Among such an approximated
path, the one with the simplest structure will ｬ ｾ obtained
by 12xLiminiIlg the concli tions which the imputed prices of
private and social capital have to satisfy.
Let PS(t) ｾ ｮ ､ pv(t) respectively be the ｾ ｰ ｵ ｴ ･ ､
IJrices at time t, of private capital Ka and social overhead
｣ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｬ V, and let pet) and 0(t) te the ｩ ｴ ｾ ｵ ｴ ･ ､ prices of
output Q and the use of social overhead capital X. These
ir,ll?uted prices correspond to the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the constraints for the ojJtimum problem.
'lihe Euler-Lagrange con<litions which the optimum path has
to Eatisfy may be rearranged to yie.ld the following
conditions:
vel ua a 0= p , jUc =C X ,(1 C1 u
Fa = e ,Xa
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J B Pv 'da + (- F ) dB + -- ｾ (x/V)X p
where
where
.
Pv
Pv
= Ps
P
= <5 - z -V
r v - 4lv (zv)
I
4lv (zv)
ｾ Ｇ 13 dB
V
It may be noted that the marginal costs aasociated
with the depreciation of social overhead capital are evaluated
in ter.DS of its imputed price pv/p measured in real terms.
The quantity r S defined in (42)is nothing but the marginal
product of private capital, while the r V defined in (44)
is the marginal social product of social overhead capital
measured in real terms. Namely, the r
v
represents the
marginal gain to the society measured in real terms due to
the marginal increase in the stock of social overhead
capital v.
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The conditions (40-42) suggest that, in order to
attain an optimwn allocation of scarce resources in the
short run, one has to impose the charges equal to the
marginal social costs for the use of social overhead
capital, with the marginal social costs being defined
in the modified sense (42). On the other hand, the
pattern of accumulation of private and social capital may
be described by the conditions (41-44) describing the rules
by which the imputed prices change over time. In order to
approximate the structure of the optimum path of capital
accilluulation, I should like to consider the case ｷ ｨ ｾ ｲ ･
the imputed prices are assumed as if they were not to change
at each moment of time. Namely, the rates of accumulation
of private und social capital are oLtained vy assuming
that equations (41) and (43) are equated to zero. It can
be shown that the path of capital accumulation obtained
by such a procedure reasonably approximates the optimum
path, although the sense in which reasonable approximation
is used needs a more complicated fornalization.
If the imputed prices were assumed as if they were not
to change over time, then the rates of capital accumulation
Zs and zv' may be obtained by solving the following con-
ditions:
,
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It is easily seen that the rates of accumulation of
private and social capital are uniquely detenuined, that
the higher the marginal product of private capital, the
higher is the corresponding rate of accumulation for
private capital, and that the higher the marginal social
product of social overhead capital, the higher is the "rate
of accwnulation. On the other hand, an increase in the
social rate of discount 0 will lower the rate of accUP.1ulatiOl:'
both for private and social capital:
rl'hus, the approximate optimwn rates of accumulation
for private and social capital will Le determined OJll.::e the
marginal private or social product uf ｴ ｨ ･ ｾ ･ capital are
known. However, the marginal products of both private and
social capital depend upon the extent to which social
overhead capital is used by the member of the society.
The amount of the services of social overhead capital used
is in turn related to the imputed price Pv/p of social
overhead capital, as is seen from the uefinition of the
marginal costs.
In this part, an introductory analysis of social
overhead capital has been presented, with an emphasis upon
the implications of the presence of such an overhead
capital upon the process of resource allocation and the
ensuing pattern of real income distribution. I have
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emphasized two aspects of social overhead capital which
are not readily covered by the standard Samuelsonian
concept of pure public goods. Namely, each individual
rumaLer of the society is free to use the services of
svcial overhead capital to the extent to which he desires,
but the effectiveness of the services he uses of social
overhead capital crucially depends upon the way other
indiviliuals are using the same services, incorporating the
phenomenon uf congestion.
The lnain conclusions of this part have been concerned
with the pattern of resource allocation which results in an
optimum allocation of social as well as private reSl,,)urces,
both from u static and dynamic point of view. Prom the
stutic point of view, the given stock of social overhead
capital may be efficiently used if each individual member
is charged a price equal to the marginal social costs for ｴ ｨ ｾ
ｵ ｳ ｾ of s0cial overhead capital, provided the ｡ ､ ｭ ｩ ｮ ｩ ｾ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･
costs associated with such a pricing scheme are negligiule.
For the 0Ftlrnum allocation from the dynamic point of view,
one has first to modify the concept of the Darginal 30cial
costs fur the u.Se of social ｯ ｶ ｾ Ｚ ｾ ｲ ｨ ･ ｡ ｬ Ｑ capital, by taJ'.inq ｾ ｮ ｴ Ｈ Ｌ
account the value of the marginal depreciation of social
overhead capital due to the marginal increase in the use of
social uverhead capital. The evaluation of the marginal
depreciation of social overhead capital has Leen based upon
the Lmputed price of social overhead capital. The imputed
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price of social overhead capital, being the discounted
present value of the marginal social product or benefits
due to a marginal increase in the stock of social overhead
capital, is also a crucial factor in the determination of
the optimum rate of accumulation and corresponding invest-
ment in social 'overhead capital. The optimum rate of
accumulation of social overhead capital (although only an
approximately optimum pattern has been discussed in the
paper) is closely related to the ease or difficulty with
which such a social overhead capital may be reproduced.
It can be shown, as is expected, the more difficult and the
more costly it is to reproduce social overhead capital, the small-
er the amount to be devoted to the accumulation of such a
social overhead capital. These propositions have been
discussed in terms of the Penrose type relationships which
relate the amount of real investment to the rate by which
social overhead capital is accumulated.
The analysis has been presented for the case where
there is only one kind of social overhead capital. However,
most of the propositions obtained above may be extended,
with slight modifications, to the general case where there
are a variety of social overhead capitals--one has merely
to replace V by a vector of the stock of social overhead
capital having a number of components as many as there are
of various kinds of social overhead capital. In particular,
it is possible to extend the analysis to the case where
